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Labor Economics From a Free Market Perspective1 contains 29 essays by Walter 
Block. If I am not mistaken, seven further volumes of his papers are to appear. 
He is astonishingly prolific, and he is also well known for the large numbers of 
co-authors whom he has enlisted as collaborators. The present collection in-
cludes eleven co-authored papers, written with twelve different authors. The 
volume deals with a topic of major importance. Walter Block tells us that labor 
“accounts for some 70-75% of the GDP.” (xix) If so, it is vital for the economist 
to explain how wage rates are determined. For Block, the answer admits of no 
doubt. Wages on the free market are determined by the marginal productivity 
of the workers. Suppose a firm employs ten workers to perform the same sort of 
labor. Each will then receive approximately what the tenth worker adds to the 
product, i.e., each worker will receive the marginal revenue product. 
Why is this so? Employers will not pay more than this, since it would not be 
profitable for them to do so. If an employer, tried to pay a lesser amount, com-
peting employers would find it profitable to outbid the low payer; they would 
do so until the wage approached marginal productivity.2 
Block shows himself alert to refinements of this picture. What the worker re-
ceives is not, strictly speaking, the marginal revenue product: it is the dis-
counted marginal revenue product. Time preference accounts for the discount: 
The employer normally pays the worker immediately but must wait until the 
product is sold before he gets money himself. Because people prefer present 
goods to future goods, the employer gets a premium for waiting: equivalently, 
the employees suffer a loss because they do not wait. This is of course the Aus-
trian, as opposed to the neoclassical view; and Block skillfully argues that time 
preference is a universal feature of action. “The fact that we choose to act in the 
present, when we could have waited, shows that we prefer goods, the sooner the 
                                                 
1 Walter Block, Labor Economics From a Free Market Perspective: Employing the Unemployable 
(Singapore: World Scientific, 2008). All references to this book will be by page numbers in pa-
rentheses in the text. 
2 “More technically, below the alternative cost of MRP, namely the MRP that would obtain 
in the next best alternative to present employment.” (p.37, note 3) 
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better. . .By acting in the immediate future, instead of waiting for the more dis-
tant future, we also show ourselves as present oriented.’ (p.39) 
Block is characteristically aware of objections, and he always has a response. 
To the contention that wages are determined by bargaining power, Block an-
swers that this cannot be taken as an explanatory ultimate. If wages are below 
the DMRP, then workers have more bargaining power; if wages are above this 
rate, then employers have more bargaining power; and if wages equal the 
DMRP, then neither side has greater bargaining power. Bargaining power drops 
out of the explanation: in Wittgenstein’s phrase, it is a wheel on the machine 
that does no work. Many people who are not economists find the marginal pro-
ductivity theory hard to grasp; and in a exchange with Boyd Blundell, a religion 
professor at Block’s own university, Loyola at New Orleans, who insists on bar-
gaining power as an independent force, Block patiently explains his position. 
“‘Prof. Blundell maintains that worker ‘productivity is virtually irrelevant’ to 
the setting of labor’s compensation. Rather, it is driven by ‘bargaining power.’ 
But the latter depends almost entirely on the former.” (p.115) 
Block must overcome another objection. The process by which wages below 
the DMRP rise depends on competing firms. Only if a rival firm exists will there 
be a chance for lower wages to be bid up. What happens if there is only one 
buyer of labor services, i.e., a monopsony exists? Block responds this situation is 
most unlikely to arise in the free market. “Even on the heroic assumption that 
monopsony is itself a logically coherent analytic construct. . .outsiders will enter 
the market to take advantage of the profits earned by the monopsonist; in the 
absence of entry barriers, monopsony, even if it could be established in the first 
instance, cannot long endure.” (p.150) He himself rejects the entire concept, fol-
lowing the classic discussion of monopoly by Murray Rothbard in Chapter 10 of 
Man, Economy, and State.3 
If Block is right, wages cannot be increased beyond the DMRP. Efforts to 
push wages higher will generate unemployment, since employers will not be will-
ing to lose money by paying someone more than he is able to contribute to the 
product. Labor unions have as the principal purpose to force wages above the 
market level, and Block has little use for them. He does not deny that workers 
have a perfect right to form associations and to quit a job in concert. He rejects 
the view of W.H. Hutt that it is inherently collusive to do so. “But this [the po-
                                                 
3 Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
2004), Chapter 10. 
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sition that collusive actions by unions exploit the community] only shows that 
there is all the world of difference between economists who favor a system of 
laissez-faire capitalism, on the one hand, and those who favor a system of na-
tional or state capitalism on the other.” (p.71) But beyond this, workers’ asso-
ciations have no right forcibly to impede others from engaging in business with 
a firm that the workers wish to bring to heel. In particular, they cannot legiti-
mately interfere with customers’ accesses to the business by picketing or use 
force against workers whom the employer hires to replace them. These workers, 
Block maintains, should not be stigmatized as “scabs”. Also to be deplored are 
laws that compel employers to deal with unions. 
In practice, Block thinks, all unions engage in such wrongful activities. He 
does not deny the possibility of a union that acted in entire accord with freedom 
of contract but professes never to have found one. Accordingly, he finds nothing 
amiss with “yellow dog” contracts that require non-membership in a union as a 
condition of employment. “The Yellow Dog Contract, in addition to safeguard-
ing employer and employee rights of free association, also serves as a remedy 
against union inflicted economic disarray and violence against innocent people 
and their property. Long live the Yellow Dog Contract. Bring it back. Now.” 
(p.110) 
In their efforts to raise wages above the free market, unions also support 
minimum wage laws; and legislation of this type arouse our author’s well-
justified ire. Minimum wage laws hurt the poor and unskilled. The laws make it 
unprofitable to hire, or to continue in employment, workers whose DMRP is be-
low the minimum wage. 
Why do unions, whose members normally earn well above the minimum 
wage, support these laws? They do so to restrict competition. Faced by high 
wage demands from unions, employers will be tempted to hire lower skilled 
workers to replace the union members, even if they have to increase the number 
of people on their payroll to get the job done. Minimum wage laws hinder their 
ability to do so. 
The great majority of economists agree with Block that minimum wage laws 
cause unemployment. Unfortunately, a number do not. In particular, a petition 
signed by 350 economists, including such luminaries as Kenneth Arrow and Jo-
seph Stiglitz, claimed that minimum wage legislation was a good idea in present 
conditions. But what about unemployment? These economists do not deny that 
sufficiently high minimum wages would cause unemployment — imagine, e.g., a 
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minimum wage set at $10,000 per hour. They claim, though, that that if the 
rate is moderate, the law will do no harm and may do some good.  
Block is outraged. If the argument that minimum wage laws cause unem-
ployment is correct, then even a “moderate” rate will result in unemployment, 
so long as the rate is above the DMRP of some workers. Block thinks it is a dis-
grace that these economists have ignored elementary principles, and he reprints 
the entire list of signers to call attention to their misdeed. “One of these days 
justice will prevail, and the eminent reputations of all those who signed the 
document will be called into question.” (p.160) 
Block must here face an objection; and, as usual, he has an effective answer. 
“Your theory is all well and good”, the objector might say, “but careful empiri-
cal studies show that minimum wage rates do not have the dire effects you 
claim. What of Card and Krueger?” This study compared employment in fast 
food restaurants in New Jersey, which enacted a minimum wage law, with 
Pennsylvania, which did not. The student found no significant employment ef-
fects resulting from the law. 
Block responds with a detailed criticism of their often-cited study. It is based 
on an inadequate sample; it suffers from other statistical failings; and it ignores 
the effects of earlier federally imposed minimum wages. Though best known as 
an Austrian economist, Block received his training in neoclassical economics and 
is thoroughly familiar with econometrics. His criticism of Card and Krueger il-
lustrates what he regards as a fundamental point. The theorems of economics 
are established through deductive reasoning, starting from the axiom of action. 
(This is of course the view of Mises in Human Action.) As such, they cannot be 
refuted through empirical tests. If a test result goes counter to an established 
theorem of praxeology, there must be a mistake somewhere. “Even more daunt-
ing is that fact that their [Card and Krueger’s] findings are contrary to eco-
nomic law. . .On the level of pure theory, then, it must count against CK that — 
apart from the economically dubious monopsony argument — they felt no need 
to account for their anomalous findings.” (p.150) 
The collection includes papers from a wide variety of other topics as well, in-
cluding immigration and reparations; but I have concentrated on a central 
theme. In all the papers, Blocks writes from a firm commitment to libertarian-
ism; and he displays a complete mastery of technical economics. It is a powerful 
combination. 
 
 
